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Rivera: Fine-grained memory protection

Fine-grained memory protection
ABSTRACT
Aside from malicious software gaining access and corrupting sections of computer
memory, even legitimate software can inadvertently overwrite and damage its own memory
content. Memory protection units exist that enable programmers to cordon off sensitive sections
of memory. However, there is currently no mechanism to protect sensitive memory from code
running in the same address space as that of the memory. Further, software that runs in
privileged mode can change protection status of memory regions by modifying registers of the
memory protection unit itself.
This disclosure provides a mechanism for protected memory to be accessible by code
segments that are specifically authorized to do so. Per the techniques described herein, a
protected memory region includes addresses of protected memory and addresses of code-space
that is authorized to access such protected memory. An instruction that requests access to
protected memory is tested for authorization. If such authorization succeeds, execution of the
instruction continues uninterrupted, else an exception is thrown.
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BACKGROUND
There is generally some chance that software can potentially corrupt contents of its own
writable memory. This is especially true for single-address space applications written in
languages such as C/C++, which are by design close to machine-level language for purposes of
efficiency, and which have no built-in overwrite protections. Examples of single-address space
applications include OS kernels, bare-metal embedded software running a microcontroller, etc.
For software that runs under the protection of a memory management unit (MMU), e.g.,
user applications, OS kernels, etc., code areas are protected from corruption, as they typically
only have read permission. However, writable data sections and memory-mapped I/O areas can
be modified unintentionally. For bare-metal embedded software running a microcontroller with
no MMU support, even code areas are not free of the possibility of corruption. Although a
memory protection unit (MPU) can be used to reduce the chances of accidental corruption,
software running in privileged mode can inadvertently or deliberately corrupt registers of the
MPU itself, resulting in disablement of the MPU.
To the extent that an MMU provides memory protection by partitioning memory on a
per-application basis, it does so at the page level, typically 4 kilobytes or larger. An MPU
provides memory protection at the region level, typically 32 bytes or larger. Although an MMU
is typically used to provide data protection/isolation between multiple virtual address spaces, it
can in theory be used to provide data protection within the same address space. For example, by
dynamically mapping/unmapping pages of virtual memory, data structures or I/O registers
encapsulated by a given code module can be made visible upon entry to the public routines of the
module and hidden upon exit from the public routines of the module.
This approach requires protected data structures (or I/O registers) to be in their own

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1796

3

Rivera: Fine-grained memory protection

memory pages, as the MMU only provides page-level granularity of protection. A similar
approach can be implemented using an MPU. However, existing MMUs/MPUs do not support
restricting access to a given memory address range from code modules running in the same
address space.
It is thus observed that once access is granted to a given address range, any part of the
code running in the same address space can access that address range, thereby opening a security
loophole or possibility of malfunction. The problem is therefore one of providing fine-grained
data protection or isolation from code within the same address space.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure provides techniques that restrict access to a given address range to
specifically authorized code modules or segments. Per the techniques, a given code module with
encapsulated internal data or I/O registers is authorized to access such data or I/O registers.
Access from other code triggers an access violation exception. Similarly, invocation of safetycritical or security-sensitive code is restricted to an expected set of callers. Calls from other
modules trigger an access violation exception, which is handled suitably by the OS.
A memory-protection unit (MPU) has a programming interface to specify regions of
memory that are privileged, e.g., protected from reading and/or writing and/or execution, by
applications other than privileged applications. Examples of privileged applications include
kernel processes, processes owned by a root user, etc.
Per techniques of this disclosure, a memory-protection unit is augmented with registers
that enable programmers to specify regions of code-space that are authorized to access a
protected region of memory. Protected memory can include memory that stores data or code. If
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code resides in protected memory, execution of such code is subject to the caller having
authorization to do so.

Fig. 1: Memory protection unit with use of authorized code registers

Fig. 1 illustrates an example memory protection unit with provision for specifying
authorized code segments, per techniques of this disclosure. The memory protection unit (100)
includes one or more region descriptor sub-units (102a-c), each pertaining to a certain region of
memory. Within a region descriptor, protected memory space (also known as target memory
region) is identified by registers indicating a start-address (104), an end-address (106), and the
nature of permissions (108) granted, e.g., read and/or write and/or execute. Code that is
authorized to access the protected region of memory is identified by a start-address register (110)
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and an end-address register (112). Alternately, regions of protected memory space and
authorized code-space can be specified by a start-address register and a size register.
MPU registers, e.g., as in Fig. 1, are writable by privileged code, e.g., kernel code, but
not ordinarily by user applications. If a user application requires access to these registers, such
application code can make system calls to do so. Direct access to MPU registers by user
applications, e.g., bypassing the invocation of a system call, causes an exception.
A developer of kernel or other privileged code accesses the MPU registers using
specifically designed APIs. Alternately, source code can be annotated with pragmas (e.g.,
compiler or preprocessor directives) to indicate protected regions of memory and corresponding
authorized segments of code. Still alternately, kernel developers can leverage the compiler, with
its built-in knowledge of the target architecture and memory map, to generate code that populates
the registers of the MPU. Using the compiler to thus set up protected memory regions and
authorize code segments during the start-up phase of a program enables the programmer to
achieve superior memory protection with almost no additional programming burden.

Fig. 2: Memory protection unit as a hardware module

Architecturally, the MPU can be implemented as a hardware module (202) situated
between a CPU core (204) and memory (206), as shown in Fig. 2. The MPU intercepts memory
accesses (e.g., memory loads/stores) from the CPU and determines if the code requesting access
to a particular region of memory is authorized to do so. If a code instruction is authorized, e.g.,
the location of the instruction falls within the start and end addresses of the authorized code
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regions (as illustrated in Fig. 1), the instruction is permitted to access the memory without
interruption.
If a memory-access attempt is made by code located outside of the authorized code range,
the CPU triggers an access protection fault exception. The hardware module that includes the
MPU can be advantageously integrated onto the same semiconductor chip that includes the CPU,
e.g., integrated with the CPU core. In the case of smaller microcontrollers, the mechanism
described herein can be advantageously integrated into an existing MPU. In the case of a larger
processor or ASIC, the mechanisms described herein can be advantageously integrated into an
existing memory management unit (MMU).

Fig. 3: Determination of whether an instruction is authorized to access a memory location

Fig. 3 illustrates an example procedure for an MPU to determine if an instruction is
authorized to access a particular memory location. Upon receipt of an instruction (302), e.g., an
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instruction to load from or store into a certain memory location, the MPU tests if the memory to
be accessed lies within a protected region (304). If the memory location does not lie within a
protected region, the instruction executes without interruption (308). If the memory location lies
within a protected memory region, the program counter is checked to see if it includes a codeinstruction address that lies within an authorized code region (306). If the program counter
includes a code-instruction address that lies within an authorized code region, then the
instruction executes without interruption (308), else an exception is thrown (310).
Example scenarios where the techniques of this disclosure apply include:
● Single-address space applications such as kernel or other privileged code.
● User applications running within a single section of a multi-address memory map.
● Relatively small microcontrollers running bare-metal operating systems on physical
memories.
● Larger microprocessors utilizing heavy-weight operating systems, virtual memory, and
memory management units to partition memory into mutually isolated multiple sections,
each such memory section allocated to a single application.
● Device drivers, implemented such that device-driver code, and no other code, is
authorized to access memory-mapped I/O registers of the corresponding peripheral.
● Safety or security-critical code, such that only authorized callers can invoke such code.
Device drivers, bare-metal/ heavy-weight operating systems (and kernels thereof),
microcontrollers/ microprocessors running single or multi-address space applications, etc. are
found almost ubiquitously. The techniques of this disclosure therefore apply to most consumer
devices, e.g., laptops, desktops, mobile devices, IoT devices, medical equipment, security
devices, etc.
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CONCLUSION
Aside from malicious software gaining access and corrupting sections of computer
memory, even legitimate software can inadvertently overwrite and damage its own memory
content. Memory protection units exist that enable programmers to cordon off sensitive sections
of memory. However, there is currently no mechanism to protect sensitive memory from code
running in the same address space as that of the memory. Further, software that runs in
privileged mode can change protection status of memory regions by modifying registers of the
memory protection unit itself.
This disclosure provides a mechanism for protected memory to be accessible by code
segments that are specifically authorized to do so. Per the techniques described herein, a
protected memory region includes addresses of protected memory and addresses of code-space
that is authorized to access such protected memory. An instruction that requests access to
protected memory is tested for authorization. If such authorization succeeds, execution of the
instruction continues uninterrupted, else an exception is thrown.
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